A REPLY TO PROFESSOR CROSSKEY

E-VIDENTLY
CHARES FAURMN t

M. CROSSIKEY AND I do not do our sums in the same
way. The "attack" upon him consisted of a book review, "The
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Limitations on State
Governmental Authority"' (hereinafter "Review"). In reviewing a book
one should act judicially. My judgment on the assigned portion, Part V,
was in exact accord with that subsequently pronounced by Professor
Goebel:
Let it be said at once that Mr. Crosskey's performance, measured by even the
least exacting of scholarly standards, is in the reviewer's opinion without merit....
Mr. Crosskey... coming to his task with a new axe to grind has seemingly
forsworn
2
all canons of objectivity to make himself a grindstone to suit his purposes.

In Part Two of his present article (hereinafter "Article") he takes his
exceptions and makes his explanations. The battle rages around Barron
v. Baltimore.3 He undertook to show that the decision was "without any
warrant at all" and Marshall's opinion "a sham. ' 4 I thought he did
exactly what he charged Marshall with having done: announced what
was incorrect "as if the correctness thereof were clear and certain, beyond
the possibility of any doubt." 5 I will comment on a few typical passages
in Part Two; failure to mention others implies no concession.
First, Mr. Crosskey's method of constitutional interpretation: "We
ask... what those words would mean. .. ." Thus he settles a very large
subject, dogmatically, before he begins his first sentence. If he had
stuck to his canon, it would perhaps be in order to meet him on that
ground. In fact, however, he ranges widely to argue what participants
said (insofar as their words can be made to serve his thesis) and much
more what they must be presumed to have intended. The controversy,
then, does not turn upon canons of construction. It turns upon what
are proper methods of scholarly research and exposition.
t Nagel Professor of Constitutional Law, School of Law, Washington University.
121 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 40 (1953).
2Book Review, 54 Col. L. Rev. 450, 451 (1954).

37 Pet. (U.S.) 242 (1833).
4Politics and the Constitution 1056, 1081.
Politics and the Constitution 1076; Review, p. 77.
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It misconceives to suggest that my criticism went mainly to a single
sentence. (Article, pp. 119-20.) To test the validity of his method, a few
key points were probed. I quit only when time and space ran out. One
does not have to eat all of an apple to judge of its quality.
Let us turn to a few obvious matters. I hope the reader will have the
book review before him. See page 120 of the Article, and pages 47-51
and 57-58 of the Review.
The [New Hampshire] Convention ... in order to ... secure the blessings of
Liberty.... Do ... ratify the said Constitution for the United States of America;
[semicolon] and as it is the opinion of this Convention, that certain amendments and
alterations... would remove the fears and quiet the apprehensions of many of the
good people of this State, and more effectually guard against an undue administrationof
the federal Goernment.... (Italics supplied.)

-then followed a proposed Bill of Rights, sometimes commanding "Congress shall [not]," sometimes speaking in general terms. What would those
words mean? Clearly, the sentence expresses two distinct thoughts: (1) To
secure the blessings of liberty, the Constitution is ratified. (2) To guard
against an undue administration of the federal government, a bill of
rights is proposed. Mr. Crosskey, in his zeal, reads the sentence thus:
they sought the blessings of liberty; it would (in his view) better secure
those blessings if a bill of rights were imposed upon the states too; so "I
see no reason why this proposal of New Hampshire should not be understood to mean what it literally said." Let the reader judge.
Further, Mr. Crosskey states,
I still fail to see why, even [if the New Hampshire and Massachusetts declarations
were as Mr. Fairman represented], my omission to mention these declarations would
have been reprehensible.... I was seeking to show that demand for limitations on
the states was not absent from the situation. For that purpose, one state convention
[Virginia] seemed enough.... (Pp. 121-22.)

Here were two state conventions, whose purpose (I insist) was clearly to
seek a bill of rights limiting only the general government: to attain that
objective, sometimes they wrote "Congress shall [not]," sometimes they
forbade generally. Eight participants went from those conventions to the
First Congress, where the Bill of Rights was framed-eight members to
whom the words did not mean what Mr. Crosskey says they mean. Yet
Mr. Crosskey sees no lack of candor in omitting to mention these matters;
he was seeking only to show that demandfor limitationswas not absent from
the situation.I do not challenge Mr. Crosskey's sincerity; this prepossessed
obtuseness to the elementary requirements of scholarly candor is the most
significant feature of his entire work.
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Now consider Mr. Crosskey's explanation (pp. 123-24) of his failure to
refer to Chancellor Walworth's conclusions, contrary to his own. (Review, pp. 45-46, 69-70.) What it comes to is that Walworth read what
Mr. Crosskey read-yes, Walworth refers to the action of the Senateand saw nothing significant in the circumstances that Mr. Crosskey
would have us believe were important. So, he explains, there was obviously nothing in what Walworth had to say; and so there was no reason
even to mention it. Perhaps the reader, if advised, would have thought
otherwise.
A glance at a point, so obvious that one feels mean to have to make a
contest: Spencer, C. J., in People v. Goodwin. (Review, p. 70; Article,
pp. 125-26.) It was not material, said the judge, to decide whether the
Fifth Amendment applied to state courts; "I am... inclined to the
opinion" that it does. (Throughout the discussion of the case, the Chief
often said "I.")
Upon the whole, I am of opinion, that ... [and here he stated the holding]....
In this opinion my brethren entirely concur.... 6
In expressing an inclination on a matter not material, a judge assumes
far less responsibility than when he states a firm conclusion. I added that
it was "not warranted" to say that [all] "the judges of the Supreme Court
of New York ... were of the opinion" that the federal Bill of Rights
governed the states. One cannot say whether they concurred in the
"inclination." This is simply one of a myriad of instances where Mr.
Crosskey takes a penny point and seeks to pass it off for a gold sovereign.
Then there is the much more substantial matter of Spencer's subsequent conduct in the New York constitutional convention of 1821. See
the Review, pp. 65-70, where it is made clear that the Chief Justice did
not regard the federal Bill of Rights as binding upon New York. Mr. Crosskey seeks to explain away one of the Chief's remarks by providing a new
meaning for the "cruel or unusual punishments" provision of the Eighth
Amendment; he is happy to explain that doubtless Spencer understood
it to mean only that Congress shall not attach any punishment that it
regards as cruel or unusual, and that no state legislature shall attach any
punishment that it regards as cruel or unusual. With that brilliant bit
of exegesis, Mr. Crosskey drops the subject of Spencer and the New York
convention.
Bank of Columbia v. Okely,7 discussed in the Review at p. 75 and in the
6 18

Johns. (N.Y.) 187, 201, 207 (1820).

7 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 235, 242, 244 (1819).
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Article at pp. 127 ff. Look away for a moment from Justice Johnson's sentence: does not Mr. Crosskey's entire theory of the case seem improbable?
The Court reached out to make a momentous ruling that was unnecessary
and indeed out of the rational order for deciding the case-and then secreted it so well that only Mr. Crosskey's industry discovered it. So it is
"presumed that the whole Court membership, in 1819, were of opinion"
that the Bill of Rights did bind the states. So when in 1833 the Court
ruled otherwise, the Justices, it is said, were really taking fright and reversing themselves. (So far as appears, the Okely case was not cited for
the holding Mr. Crosskey sees when the question came to be argued in
1833.) A few pages later the reader is invited to "recall" as a fact that
the Court, and in particular justice Story, held the Seventh Amendment
to be applicable to the states.
State decisions, prior to Barron v. Baltimore, holding that the federal
Bill of Rights did not apply to the states-the Review at 73-74, and the
Article at pp. 131-32: Admittedly Mr. Crosskey omitted to mention them,
and now he "[does] not see why" this was any dereliction on his part. He
writes:
I was u der [no] duty to pursue a subject in which I had io interest.... After all, state

decisimsfavorable to state power uetder the Constitution from the early years are not very
persuasive evidence.... (Italics supplied.)

Maybe his readers would have been interested even if he was not; maybe
they would have regarded such decisions as relevant and even significant.
At any rate, if he was going to exclude all state decisions not favorable to
the view he supports, he might in candor have posted a notice such as this:
The author will not cite state decisions unless they are on the side favorable to federal
authority.
Is this an admission that throughout his two volumes he has practiced
such omission?
Now a glance at those Massachusetts decisions on whether a jury,
hopelessly disagreed, may be discharged without the assent of the accused
(the Review at pp. 62-64; the Article at pp. 132 ft.): The common law concerning double jeopardy provides the answer. The federal Constitution,
within the scope of its operation, also forbade double jeopardy. Yet in
finding the common law's answer, the state judges, in Mr. Crosskey's
view, looked up and made an obeisance to the Fifth Amendment-and
then went ahead to do exactly as they would have done even if the Fifth
Amendment had not existed. On what does he base his contention that
they acknowledged that that amendment was controlling? (It would be
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helpful if the reader would at this point look at 2 Pickering 521, to form his
independent judgment.) Ohe Purchase had been convicted of manslaughter by a second jury; the first jury had been dismissed after failure to agree.
He moved in arrest of judgment, contending that his life had been twice
put in jeopardy. Counsel's argument is summarized, concluding "[hie
cited the 5th art. of Amendments to the Const. U. S." Then
Davis, Solicitor General, for the commonwealth, cited and relied on Commonwealth
v. Bowden, 9 Mass. R. 494; United States v. Coolidge, 2 Gallison, 364 [where the federal
circuit court, per Story, J., had sustained the power of the court to discharge the
jury, without any reference to the Fifth Amendment]....
From this Mr. Crosskey states boldly that counsel were agreed "the
Fifth Amendment was applicable"-because a seven-line summary of
the Solicitor General's citations includes no statement that he repelled
the point, in a controversy where the common law would in any event be
decisive. Chief Justice Parker stated the question as set out in my Review
at p. 64 and by Mr. Crosskey at p. 134-and proceeded to discuss the
common law without mention of the amendment. On this gossamer
thread Mr. Crosskey hangs his conclusion that the court was "explicit
that it was deciding the case under the Constitution of the United States."
(So in his view this was a ruling adverse to a claim of federal right. It
would follow that Purchase could have gone up to the Supreme Courtbut evidently he did not do so.)
From here Mr. Crosskey throws out another gossamer line. Sitting
with Parker, C. J., were Justices Wilde and Putnam. (The reader should
keep his eye on Parker and Wilde in the discussion that follows.) In my
Review (at pp. 58 et seq.) I pointed out that two representatives from
Massachusetts in the First Congress-hence, participants in the submission of the Bill of Rights-thereafter sat on the Supreme Judicial
Court: Sedgwick (1746-1813; Justice 1802-1813) and Thacher (17541824; Justice 1800-1824). I pointed out that Justices Parker, Wilde, and
Jackson sat on the bench with these two founding fathers of the Bill of
Rights; further, that Parker, Wilde, and Jackson were members of the
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1820-where the debates,
I believe, show clearly that it was understood that the federal Bill of
Rights did not bind the states. I said that if the members of the First
Congress had designed the Bill of Rights to operate upon the states, then
surely Sedgwick and Thacher would have imparted their understanding
to their associates in the course of administering justice. (This was not on
the basis of any remote conjecture that they would have chatted about it,
but because it must have come up in reasoning upon cases before the
court.)
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Now (at p. 135) Mr. Crosskey says, in effect: since he has now shown
that Parker and Wilde, in Commonwealth v. Purchase, "distinctly recognized" that the Bill of Rights did govern the states, this demonstrates
"the unreliability of a great mass of other so-called 'evidence' that Mr.
Fairman threw at my head last year.... Mr. Fairman's procedure was to
follow various prominent Americans of the late eighteenth century, and
early nineteenth century, into various state constitutional conventions
and state legislatures, and to present their behavior there as 'evidence'
that they did not think Amendments II-VIII bound the states." I urge
the reader to go back to the Review, at pp. 47-50 (New Hampshire's
record); 52-54 (Pennsylvania); 54-56 (Connecticut); 57-64 (Massachusetts); 64-65 (Maine); 65-69 (New York); and 72-73 (Vermont)and then consider whether all this evidence is really demonstrated to be
unreliable because Parker, C. J., in the Purchase case, stated that the
question to be discussed by the court was "whether by the common law, or
by virtue of the constitution of the United States," the second trial was
prohibited.
In those passages in the Review one will find numerous instances where
men who had been in a position to know if the Bill of Rights had been
intended to govern the states were in situations where it would have
been their public duty to declare any such knowledge. Mr. Crosskey
dismisses the lot by saying that we do not know whether they were
"acutely aware of all the detailed provisions" of the Bill of Rights. "[I]t
must be assumed that the delegates were experts on Amendments II-VIII,
in order to provide any basis at all for Mr. Fairman's inferences." (P.
136.) Let the reader examine the Review and consider whether those
participants-often state judges-could not qualify as experts on the
meaning of a trial jury, indictment by grand jury, and the like. Is it even
to be supposed that John Adams-who had won acquittal for a British
captain for his part in the "Boston Massacre"-would be so hazy as to
have forgotten the provisions of the Bill of Rights? Consider, in contrast,
how much weight Mr. Crosskey attaches to the opinions of the law writers,
William Rawle, Jr., and Joseph K. Angell. And, looking ahead for a
moment, consider how remarkably knowledgeable are Mr. Crosskey's
Fourteenth Amendment witnesses; they are so perceptive that they all
know just what (Mr. Crosskey says) Bingham meant in a speech in 1859,
even better than Bingham himself was able to express it.
What was demonstrated in my discussion of state constitution-making,
legislation, and judicial decision was that, in practice, the country never
ran on the theory Mr. Crosskey now advocates: never ran that way even
when the makers of the Bill of Rights were all about to cry aloud if the
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Constitution was being breached. This is a great bed-rock fact-and no
amount of finicking contention about an occasional obscure sentence is
going to budge it. Time after time, state conventions deliberated on the
theory that they were not restrained by the federal Bill of Rights; sometimes they adopted a provision that would be inconsistent with a federal
provision. (By the way, I never assumed that they should know Supreme
Court decisions before they were made; I did say that they would have
stopped to consider a potential constitutional question.) Mr. Crosskey
says (p. 139) that two states in 1790 put into their constitutions certain
of the prohibitions of Article I, Section 10, and left others out; therefore,
he concludes, it is "not reliable" to attach significance to the fact that
states adopted measures which (if the federal Bill of Rights governed)
would have been unconstitutional. Now it is ,easy to understand that a
state may duplicate some and not all of the federal restrictions; but this
does not lessen the significance of a state provision actually in conflict
with what the federal Bill of Rights (if applicable) would command.
One may test Mr. Crosskey's logic by another passage-(Article,
pp. 138-39):
(1) William Rawle, Jr., believed that the Bill of Rights limited the
states.
(2) Story cited Rawe-not on this point-with approval.
(3) Story wrote that it had been held in the state courts that the
"cruel or unusual punishments" clause of the Eighth Amendment did
not apply to the states; the point did not seem to have arisen in the
federal courts.
So (4) it is to be inferred "from such evidence as we have" that "he
agreed with William Rawle, or, at the very least, that he considered the
question... open."

Doubtless this "evidence" is the Okely case, already discussed, where
it was "presumed" that in 1819 Story believed what Mr. Crosskey wants
him to believe. Here I subscribe to Professor Ernest J. Brown's comment
in his book review:
Mr. Crosskey apparently believes that like Antaeus retouching Mother Earth, a
conclusion gains strength each time it is repeated. 8
Now I turn to Part One of Mr. Crosskey's article dealing with my

article on the Fourteenth Amendment-2 Stanford L. Rev. 5 (1949)
(hereinafter, "Stanford article"). I hope the readerhas had that study before
him, in order to make a fair judgment on the matters in controversy.
8

67 Harv. L. Rev. 1439, 1452 (1954).
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The question involved was the validity of the contention of Mr.
justice Black, dissenting in Adamson v. California,9 that the history of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment showed a purpose to make
the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. Going over the same and much
additional ground, I reached the conclusion that it did not. I analyzed
the fundamental problem, in a federal form of government, of creating
individual rights against the state-which I believe is difficult and elusive.
I then examined the long history of the debates in 1866, to inquire, very
critically, whether the participants really meant to incorporate the Bill
of Rights in the new amendment. I thought the comments of the members on what they thought the amendment would do showed that, for
the most part, they had failed to think to the bottom of their difficult
problem. I said that "[w]hen the Slaughter-House Cases0 put the privileges and immunities clause to a rigorous'scrutiny, its looseness became
apparent." (P. 139.) Mr. Crosskey thinks I was unjustly making "ninnies"
(Article, p. 74) out of many of the participants. I find it much easier to
believe that a number of members of that Congress were "ninnies"
about the difficult problem before them than to suppose that most of the
Justices of the Supreme Court have been knaves-which seems to be the
conclusion of Mr. Crosskey's book.

Urging the reader to look for himself to my Stanford article and to the
CongressionalGlobe, I here confine myself to a few general observations.
First, I draw attention to the freedom Mr. Crosskey allows himself in
handling the material. He cheerfully goes along with rewriting Article
IV, Section 2-although he concedes the result is "not quite" what the
text says. (Article, p. 12.) He changes the punctuation (p. 64), adds
words (p. 37), obliterates words as "mere rhetoric" (p. 65), amends
to help out a speaker who "had [been] somehow confused" (p. 58),

charges the reporters with "some slight garbling" (p. 58), assumes that
they have made "mistakes and omissions" (p. 37), excuses Bingham

or the reporter for "a mistake" and cures it by adding a word that alters
the meaning (p. 37), and reminds us that "speakers, especially ardent

men like John A. Bingham, are sometimes guilty of slips and lapses"
-(p. 37). He even supplies Mr. Bingham with a bit of stage property at a
moment when it was badly needed. In the Stanford article I had pointed
out that Mr. Bingham's reference to "this immortal bill of rights" and
the like, when read in context, left the greatest doubt whether he meant
specifically the first eight amendments. (Pp. 26, 31, 34.)
9332 U.S. 46, 68 at 71 (1947).

1016 Wall.

(U.S.) 36 (1873).
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Mr. Crosskey explains it this way:
Bingham ... had been reading provisions out of the Constitution; he probably
had a copy of the document in his hand; and when he came to the place where he
referred to "this immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitution," he may
very well simply have held the document up, as Mr. Fairman says, "in [a] spacious
gesture." (P. 28.)
You're fudging, Professor Crosskey! You don't know that Bingham
had been reading from the Constitution. Did so intelligent a man have to
keep the Constitution with him in order to quote its phrases? How can you
say that "he probably had a copy of the document in his hand" and
waved it when he said "bill of rights"? There we have a practical construction of Mr. Crosskey's idea of what "probably" happened. And
what was "probable" tends soon to make the king-row and, on being
crowned an absolute certainty, can then be used to bump off opposing
facts.
I take time for one comment on one speech in the debates-that of
Representative Price, which went without mention in the Stanford article.
Hiram Price was an Iowa merchant and banker. Mr. Crosskey quotes, in
part, from his speech, and finds it clear that Price thought the proposed
amendment would impose the Bill of Rights. (Pp. 33-34.) In the speechalong with much bantering of the Democrats-Price made this direct
statement of what he thought the measure meant:
I say, sir, that the intention of the resolution before the House is to give the same
rights, privileges, and protection to the citizens of one State going into another
that a citizen of that State would have who had lived there for years.'
He had passed the time of life, he said, when he expected to travel in the
southern country, but he wanted to have a constitution that would protect his children and his children's children who might have occasion to
travel in any part of the United States. He showed no concern for protecting the citizen of Iowa at home; his concern was to protect the citizen
going into another state.
If nothing of real moment were involved in all this, one would gladly
avoid irritating Mr. Crosskey, as Polonius humored Hamlet: the cloud
is indeed like a camel ... backed like a weasel... and very like a whale.
But this is a constitution we are expounding.
From here on I must hit only the high spots. The application of the
Bill of Rights to the states means, inter alia, that no person shall be held
to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury; that in all criminal prosecutions the
u Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. ist Sess. 1066 (1865-66).

19541

A REPLY TO PROFESSOR CROSSKEY

accused shall enjoy the right to trial by a common-law jury of twelve;
and that in suits at common law, where the value in controversy exceeds
twenty dollars, there is a right of trial by jury. General talk about making
the Bill of Rights applicable to the states has an obscure and beguiling
sound if one fails to pin it firmly to those specific provisions.
At the outset, Mr. Crosskey simply announces that the privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has this "undeniably
obvious" meaning and purpose: to impose the Bill of Rights upon the
states. "The clause seems about as clear as a clause could be." (P. 6.)
That is a great big dogmatic assumption.
How do we know that that was the meaning and purpose? Because in
1859 Mr. Bingham made a speech in Congress. Let us take Mr. Crosskey's
account at pp. 13-14. Bingham talked about natural rights, and did not
mention the civil jury, etc.-but let's not quibble.
Next, another assumption: Bingham's views were "the common faith
of the political party" to which he belonged. (P. 11.) So every Republican
in 1866-however confused he may appear in the debate-really meant
that he wanted what Mr. Crosskey says Bingham meant in 1859. Mr.
Crosskey says that this was a "peculiar view" that all the Republicans
shared. (P. 16.) They "held ideas distinctly their own ..... " (P. 18.) If
we will only accept and keep constantly in mind these "old, forgotten
Republican constitutional ideas" (p. 21)-then all the unproved assumptions that went into the premise will come out in the conclusion.
I interject a few words about my treatment of Mr. Bingham. Mr.
Crosskey thinks I question his truthfulness. (P. 14.) No, I was clear in
saying (Stanford article, p. 137):
We have dealt with Mr. Bingham in this article on the view that, however confused,
he was sincere. If for a moment one were to suppose that he was astutely endeavoring

to bring a wooden horse into the Constitution, certainly the result must be clear:
no such fraud on the nation could be countenanced.
Mr. Crosskey says that Bingham drafted on the theory that his own very
special ideas, and not the Supreme Court's decisions, were the standing
law (p. 25). I would think it plain that anyone who acted on such a
view was a purblind and bull-headed draftsman. But Mr. Crosskey finds
him a kindred spirit and pronounces the amendment to have been
12
"painstakingly and skilfully drawn.
And the Democrats in Congress-were they aware that the Republicans
were drafting and debating a constitutional amendment in a peculiar
1

2 Politics and the Constitution

1084.
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language of special meaning? Yes, Mr. Crosskey assures us, the Democrats "very certainly understood." (P. 35.)
So in Mr. Crosskey's theory the Fourteenth Amendment-by far the
most important amendment to the Constitution-was framed and discussed under very special conditions. The movers acted on the assumption that their own peculiar ideas, and not the decisions of the Supreme
Court, were the law. Time passed, and this special vocabulary was forgotten-and then Professor Crosskey discovered the Rosetta stone and
deciphered the ancient records.
One of the many objections to this theory is suggested by Professor
Hart's comment upon another part of Mr. Crosskey's book:
The readiness... to impute lack of scruple to others, wholesale, is worthy of note.
But what is of main interest is the ineffability of the assumption that in the interpretation of a document embodying a grant of fundamental powers from the people
to their government the representations made to the people to obtain the grant are

irrelevant, and what alone counts are the secret thoughts of the men who drew the
document the people approved. 13

With slight paraphrase, the same comment may be made on his theory of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Personal notions floating about may be of
interest in a history of political ideas, but they cannot be admitted as
operative facts in the making of a constitution.
If the Fourteenth Amendment was as clearly drawn as Mr. Crosskey
believes, and meant what he says it meant, surely that plain meaning
would have come out, time and time again, in the ratifying legislatures.
I traced all the records that are available. (Stanford article, pp. 81-132.)
Governor after governor, submitting the proposed amendment, commented on its purpose, but never was it suggested that the federal Bill
of Rights would now govern the state. The governor of Ohio made a
vague reference to protecting freedom of speech and other essentials
of free government. In Massachusetts a committee, zealous for Negro
rights, complained that the amendment merely duplicated the Bill of
Rights; they urged deferment. The minority report, recommending ratification, was adopted. I think the barrenness of these records exceedingly
significant; Mr. Crosskey counts the silences as neutral.
If the proposed Fourteenth Amendment had been understood to impose the Bill of Rights, surely the legislatures of states whose constitution
or laws would be struck down would have so noted, and stopped to consider, before voting to ratify. I found many such inconsistencies-with
no suggestion that the adoption of the proposed amendment would react
13 Book Review, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1456, 1481 (1954).
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upon these state institutions. Mr. Crosskey brushes this practical aspect
aside: "unless a legislator were an expert on the Bill of Rights" he might
never have been aware of a conflict with the local law. (P. 112.) Can one
believe that a legislature would not have many members who knew the
local provisions on jury and grand jury, and who would cry out if it had
been supposed that the amendment would affect the local legislation?
If the proposed amendment had been understood by the Democrats to
mean that the Bill of Rights would govern the states-and we are assured
that the Democrats understood the peculiar idiom of the Republicanswould they not have made political capital out of the menace such a
proposal held? Was it perhaps that Reconstruction was such an Era of
Good Feeling that the Democrats forbore to denounce throughout the
North what the Republicans were doing?
Consider what it would have meant to impose the grand jury, the common-law jury of twelve, and the civil jury where the ad dainnum exceeds
twenty dollars. I traced all that, in the Stanford article. There are, of
course, no petty cases in the federal courts upon which the Seventh
Amendment can work; but it would have been very different in the state
courts.
Mr. Crosskey has to meet these points about juries, and he says two
interesting things.
(1) The federal provisions on grand jury and criminal jury are exactly
what the overwhelming majority of Americans would want; they ought
to be imposed.
(2) The civil jury is "an atrocious waste of manpower"; the Seventh
Amendment is a "thoroughly bad provision." (Pp. 115-16.)
But the consideration that the Fourteenth Amendment (as Mr. Crosskey reads it) would have imposed this atrocity upon unwilling states-and
that any such imposition, if understood, would have been vehemently
resisted-all this, Mr. Crosskey insists, has nothing to do with the case.

(P. 116.)
If the Fourteenth Amendment did impose the Bill of Rights upon the
states, then men went to the penitentiary, or to their death, under procedures which violated the Constitution. As I pointed out in the Stanford
article, if the lawyers of the country had had an inkling that that was
what the amendment meant, they would have demanded for their clients
the federal rights thus secured. The reports would be full of the cases.
Mr. Crosskey says merely that
These phenomena do, indeed, tend to suggest that there may have been considerable
inattention to the amendment at the time of its adoption and, consequently, some
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unawareness of the true tenor of its various provisions. This sort of thing is always
true. (P. 119.)

"Considerable inattention" to the great amendment that was to settle
the differences within a nation so recently at war! "This sort of thing
is always true." (With Prohibition, Repeal, Woman Suffrage, etc., didn't
the word get around?) The amendment, so "crystal clear," met with
"considerable inattention," even by lawyers in states whose criminal procedure was, in Mr. Crosskey's view, now invalidated!
Further, in the Stanford article I pointed out that even the 39th Congress, which framed the amendment, when it came to passing upon the
new constitutions for the reconstructed states, seemed pretty clearly to
consider that the provisions of the Bill of Rights did not have to be complied with. (Pp. 126-32.)
Toward the end of the Stanford article I wrote, "If the theory that the
new privileges and immunities clause incorporated Amendments I to VIII
found no recognition in the practice of Congress, or in the action of the
state legislatures, constitutional conventions, or courts, it is not surprising
that the contemporary Supreme Court knew nothing of it either" (p. 132)
-citing Twitchell v. Pennsylvania.14 For once, Mr. Crosskey and I agree
upon a case. He writes:
The cases Mr. Fairman cited were cases in which counsel and courts should have
given heed to the fact, but did not, that the Fourteenth Amendment had made the
Bill of Rights good against the states. Instead, the Fourteenth Amendment was
totally ignored: nothing at all was said about it. These cases, which include one in the
Supreme Court of the United States, in 1869, undoubtedly indicate that there were
some people in the country... who were unaware of the true tenor of the new amendment. The case in the Supreme Court indicates that the justices of the Court were
among this number: a rather shocking, but by no means unique, indication of the
inalertness of the men who composed the Court of the period. (P. 113.)
In the later years, the old, original, peculiar ideas that gave meaning
to the amendment were forgotten. In the years of its youth, the amendment's true meaning was ignored; people-even justices-were unaware
of its "true tenor." There, I believe, we have the gist of the thing: Mr.
Crosskey's Fourteenth Amendment is an amendment that never was.
14

7 Wall. (U.S.) 321 (1869).

